INTRODUCTION
There is a hole in Fourth Amendment protection that is teetering on the verge of rapid expansion. The omnipresence of technology in the 21 st century has made the use of intermediaries necessary for fully participating in society. From sending messages through Facebook to driving past cellular phone towers, many everyday activities involve sharing information about ourselves with the third parties who give us access to new technology. The scope of privacy law, however, has not advanced at a similar pace. In Katz, the Court had extended protection from unreasonable searches and seizures to areas in which a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy."
3 Nine years later in Miller, the Court decided that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in information handed over to third parties (in that case, a bank). 4 The Court asserted that "the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities."
5 Smith v. Maryland widened this gap in Fourth Amendment protection to include communication information. 6 The Court stated that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers dialed into phones, since the dialer is aware that the "phone company has facilities for recording this information" and that it does, in fact, record it. 7 Miller and Smith have come to stand for the legal theory of the "third party doctrine." Professor Daniel Solove, a leading expert on privacy law, summarized the theory:
This doctrine provides that if information is possessed or known by third parties, then, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an individual lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the possibility of lower courts deciding that statutory violations are not injuries at all-an outcome that would strip a customer of his ability to sue under the RFPA if a bank releases his information. 15 Thus, despite Congress's attempt to safeguard financial records from unwarranted government intrusion, the financial privacy of Americans is being threatened in multiple levels of the judiciary.
The problem culminating from these attacks is the weakening of financial privacy protection for records in the hands of trusted third parties. The solution is this: the Supreme Court's reversal of Miller. The Supreme Court created a hole in Fourth Amendment protection in its Miller opinion and the remedy offered by Congress is now under siege because of the openended Spokeo decision and the judiciary's cramped interpretation of the RFPA. 16 Now, it is up to the Supreme Court to reverse Miller and stop the erosion of financial privacy.
Part I of this Note will discuss the Miller decision and the hole it left in the Fourth Amendment's protection of financial information left in the hands of trusted third parties. Part II will discuss Congress's response to Miller in the RFPA. Part III will discuss the cramped interpretation of the RFPA affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, its misapplication of the statute, and policy problems arising from the acceptance of the court's interpretation. Part IV will discuss statutory injuries and how the ambiguous outcome of the Spokeo case could threaten financial privacy protections generally and those specifically provided by the RFPA. Part V will discuss the proposed solution to the problem I. FINANCIAL PRIVACY AND THE MILLER DECISION A flurry of privacy laws, especially those related to safeguarding financial information, were enacted in the 1970s in response to the general distrust of government after the Vietnam War and the growing cache of customer records being stored on computers. 17 This sense of unease was exacerbated when the Supreme Court upheld the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, which required banks to maintain financial records of customers so the federal government would be able to "enforce the myriad criminal, tax, and [VOL. 94:1057 regulatory provisions of laws"-a function that had been impaired by shoddy recordkeeping. 18 An important limitation on these required records, however, was that they would "not be made automatically available for law enforcement purposes [but could] only be obtained through existing legal process." 19 To address growing concerns about how new technologies could lead to widespread data collection, Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 1974. 20 The purpose of the Privacy Act was "to promote governmental respect for the privacy of citizens" by increasing accountability and legislative oversight with respect to the use of personal information collected by the government. 21 The Act's purpose of increasing customer privacy was thwarted by the 1976 decision in United States v. Miller.
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Two weeks after deputies in Houston County, Georgia found a "7,500-gallon-capacity distillery, 175 gallons of non-tax-paid whiskey, and related paraphernalia" on his property, Mitchell Miller was charged with conspiring to defraud the government of tax revenues. 23 Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agents found evidence of Miller's untaxed income by issuing subpoenas to the presidents of Miller's bank, requesting his financial records. 24 Copies of Miller's checks obtained from his bank were used as evidence in his trial and he was ultimately convicted. 25 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, found that the subpoenas were defective and reversed the admission of the checks, finding that their admittance would violate his Fourth Amendment rights. 26 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the financial records of Miller were outside his "zone of privacy" as they were not his private papers but were instead business records owned by the bank. 27 With this reasoning, the third-party 33. The RFPA defines a "person" as "an individual or a partnership of five or fewer individuals," 12 U.S.C. § 3401(4) (2012), and a "customer" as "any person or authorized representative of that person who utilized or is utilizing any service of a financial institution, or for whom a financial institution is acting or has acted as a fiduciary, in relation to an account maintained in the person's name." Id. § 3401(5). For simplicity's sake, I will refer to the plaintiff in an RFPA action as a customer, i.e., an individual with a bank account. Further, the RFPA defines a "financial institution" as "any office of a bank, savings bank, card issuer . . . , industrial loan company, trust company, savings association, building and loan, or homestead association (including cooperative banks), credit union, or consumer finance institution," located in the United States or its territories. Id. § 3401(1). I will use "financial institution" or "bank" to mean financial institution within the RFPA.
34. Id. § 3402.
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"no Government authority may have access to or obtain copies of, or the information contained in the financial records of any customer from a financial institution" unless such records are "reasonably described" and either the customer has authorized the disclosure, or such records are disclosed pursuant to a legitimate legal process, as listed in the statute. 36 The RFPA further reinforces the protection of customer privacy within the government by limiting interagency transfers of the information. 37 In the House Report describing this section of the RFPA, the writers explain, "This section provides that information obtained under the title may not be used or retained for any purpose other than the specific statutory purpose for which the information was originally obtained, and that the information may not be transferred to another government agency without specific statutory authorization."
38 Thus, once a government agency obtains a customer's information, it is not only prohibited from sharing such information with other branches, but also limited to how the information is used even within that agency.
While § 3402 provides protection by preventing the customer's information from being obtained by government authorities, § 3403 provides protection by preventing the customer's information from being released by their financial institution. 39 § 3403, titled "Confidentiality of financial records," states, "No financial institution . . . may provide to any Government authority access to or copies of, or the information contained 35 . Id. Under the statute, a financial institution may release customer information if that information "may be relevant to a possible violation of any statute or regulation." Id. § 3403(c). Even then, the only information allowed to be disclosed is the customer's name (or the account involved) and the nature of the suspected legal activity. Id. A bank can also release customer records "as an incident to perfecting a security interest, proving a claim in bankruptcy, or otherwise collecting on a debt." Id. § 3403(d)(1). Finally, a government authority can legally obtain customer information without adhering to the safeguards of the RFPA for certain intelligence and protective purposes or in emergency situations (i.e., if delay in access "would create imminent danger of-(A) physical injury to any person; (B) serious property damage; or (C) flight to avoid prosecution."). Id. § 3414(b)(1).
36. Id. § 3402. Financial records may be released without violating the statute when the records are reasonably described and disclosed in response to an administrative subpoena or summons, a search warrant, a judicial subpoena, or a formal written request-a last resort when all the other options, including attempts to notify the customer, have failed. Id. § § 3402(2)-(5).
37. Id. § 3412(a) ("Financial records originally obtained pursuant to this chapter shall not be transferred to another agency or department unless the transferring agency or department certifies in writing that there is reason to believe that the records are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry . . . ."). § 3412(a) also allows for interagency transfers when "there is reason to believe that the records are relevant to . . . intelligence or counterintelligence activity, investigation or analysis related to international terrorism within the jurisdiction of the receiving agency or department." Id.
38 in, the financial records of any customer except in accordance with the [RFPA] ." 40 Further, the section prohibits a financial institution from releasing the information "until the Government authority seeking such records certifies in writing to the financial institution that it has complied with the applicable provisions of this chapter." 41 The latter component seems to be forbidding a financial institution from voluntarily releasing customer information, as discussed infra Part III-C(2).
Finally, the RFPA prescribes liability in § 3417, stating that any government agent or financial institution obtaining or disclosing financial records about a customer in violation of the RFPA is liable to the customer for $100 "without regard to the volume of records involved", actual and punitive damages (if applicable), and, if the customer is successful in her claim, attorney's fees. 42 
III. BRACKFIELD'S CRAMPING OF THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT
Though the RFPA appears relatively straightforward in its application, like much of the law, it contains some room for ambiguity. The RFPA prohibits financial institutions from granting the federal government "access to" customer information. 43 But, since its passage in 1978, there has been almost no case law interpreting one of the key phrases in the statute: "access to." 44 A decision on the scope of the words "access to" could mean the difference between the RFPA allowing banks to publish customer information freely, so long as there is no government authority waiting to accept it, and prohibiting a bank from releasing the information at all unless certain conditions are met. 45 In a broader sense, the Brackfield decision is important because information privacy law is a relatively new area of jurisprudence and, because of that, "privacy doctrines in one area are being used to inform and structure legal responses in other areas."
53 Because of this potential for later courts to give more weight than is warranted to earlier decisions in emerging areas of law, it is important for today's courts to consider the ease with which information can be disseminated when interpreting privacy statutes-especially those courts which are the first to declare a statute's meaning. Even in the much-maligned Miller case, Justice Brennan's dissent recognized the need for the law to take account of changes in access to information, stating:
Development of photocopying machines, electronic computers and other sophisticated instruments have accelerated the ability of government to intrude into areas which a person normally chooses to exclude from prying eyes and inquisitive minds. Consequently, judicial interpretations of the reach of the constitutional protection of individual privacy must keep pace with the perils created by these new devices.
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Since the mid-seventies, information collection and dissemination has become even more commonplace as the Internet has become a part of our daily lives. However, the Brackfield judgment reveals that even the ambiguities in old laws are still being interpreted as limiting privacy protections against the spread of personal information.
Part III will focus on analyzing "access to" in the phrase "[n]o financial institution . . . may provide to any Government authority access to or copies of, or the information contained in, the financial records of any customer" in § 3403. 55 This Part of the Note looks to answer the questions: Does releasing a customer's information into the public record constitute providing a government authority "access to" that information? Or is a more direct link required between the financial institution releasing the information and a government authority accessing it? To answer that question, this Note analyzes the meaning of the RFPA's phrase "access to" [VOL. 94:1057 in light of the applicable canons of interpretation, existing case law interpreting the RFPA, and the legislative history preceding the act, concluding with a recommended interpretation considering the need for modern privacy laws. The author recommends interpreting the RFPA as prohibiting financial institutions from granting a government authority access to a customer's financial information by releasing such information into the public record when such an action falls outside the listed exceptions.
The RFPA grants customers a cause of action against either, or both, of two entities in violation of the statute: a financial institution and a government authority. 56 This separation of entities against which claims can be brought protects customer information in two ways. It allows aggrieved customers whose financial information has been improperly disclosed a right of action against (1) the governmental authority that obtained the records, 57 and (2) the financial institution 58 that disclosed them.
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A. The Brackfield Facts
To analyze how the Brackfield court misapplied the RFPA, as well as how the phrase "access to" functions in the RFPA, it is first necessary to lay out the facts from Brackfield. 60 Brackfield & Associated Partnership and Eugene Brackfield (the general partner) were customers of BB&T. 61 In the course of their relationship, BB&T issued the plaintiffs (collectively "Brackfield") an open line of credit on the condition that Brackfield routinely provide BB&T with detailed financial information about the company, including a spreadsheet of its assets and liabilities.
62 BB&T and 56. Compare id. § 3402 (prohibiting access to financial records by government authorities), with id. § 3403 (prohibiting financial institutions from providing "access to or copies of, or the information contained in, the financial records of" customers).
57. See id. § 3402. Brackfield contractually agreed that no real property assets would serve as collateral on the loan. 63 Weeks after this agreement, BB&T filed a UCC financing statement with the Tennessee Secretary of State, 64 which need only contain the debtor's and creditor's name and address, and a general indication of the collateral property. 65 BB&T, however, included a complete listing of the assets and liabilities of the company and filed it (along with the UCC) with the Secretary of State, as well as the Register of Deeds 66 -neither of which constitute a "government authority" for the purposes of § 3401(3) since these are employees of the state and the RFPA only refers to federal agents. 67 After these filings, the UCC and its attached financial documents become part of the public record "to which the entire world, including any and all government agencies or authorities, had free and open access."
68 Since Brackfield's property was contractually excluded as collateral, the bank's recording of the UCC did not perfect a security interest in the property. 69 Additionally, even if it would have perfected such an interest, the inclusion of the company's un-redacted financial information offered no greater security than filing the UCC without that information would have offered.
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The injuries flowing from a bank publishing a customer's financial information are difficult to trace since such injuries deal more with a business's reputation than immediate losses. For example, a commercially reasonable title insurer would not insure property over which the lender appears to claim a security interest, a commercially reasonable buyer would not purchase property without title insurance, and a commercially . In addition to the first UCC filing, BB&T filed an amended version of the same information again in 2013. Brackfield, 2015 WL 5177737, at *2. The second filing occurred after Brackfield discovered that BB&T "purported to encumber assets beyond those to which the parties agreed," and Brackfield notified BB&T of the incorrect information. Id. at *2. The second UCC filing, although amended, still "contained unredacted financial records not incident to the perfection of a security interest in any of the real property described therein." Id. Brackfield claimed that each of these filings amounted to an RFPA violation and entitled them to the $100 statutory damages. [VOL. 94:1057 reasonable lender requiring a first priority lien against a property would not accept that property as collateral. 71 Thus, Brackfield would conceivably suffer the damages of receiving less favorable loan rates because of the apparent interest in the property, as well as the reputation losses associated with the release of sensitive financial information about himself and his company. These damages would accumulate even without consideration of the potential breach of Brackfield's financial privacy, which creates an even more nebulous injury.
Ultimately, the court granted BB&T's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under the RFPA. 72 It reasoned that since BB&T did not disclose Brackfield's information directly to a government authority (instead putting it into the public record, where a government authority can later obtain it), the customers had no claim. 73 The court later provided that for Brackfield to succeed in this claim, they "need only establish that their information was obtained by the Government." 74 The next sections of this Note will explain how the court misapplied the RFPA by overlooking the "access to" provision of the statute altogether, and by requiring government obtainment for a successful RFPA claim against a financial institution.
B. How Brackfield Misapplied the Right to Financial Privacy Act:
Defining "Access to"
No appellate court has interpreted the meaning of the RFPA's statutory phrase "access to." 75 To understand the meaning and scope of the phrase, it is first necessary to look at the RFPA's plain text, and then analyze the phrase using established canons of statutory construction. Remedial legislation should be broadly construed, every word of a statute is to be given effect, the term "or" is to be interpreted as disjunctive, and the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of others (expressio unius). 76 71. These injuries were among those listed in the Brackfield complaint. Brackfield Complaint, supra note 70, at ¶ ¶ 96-99. Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that "the interests in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on the public record." Cox Broad. Corp Black's Law Dictionary defines "access" as "[a] right, opportunity, or ability to enter." 77 Generally, courts assume that the words in a statute take on their ordinary meaning, or, in other words, how an ordinary or reasonable person would understand them. 78 In the RFPA, following the ordinary meaning of the word "access," the government does have access to customer financial information released into the public record. Specifically, when a bank releases a customer's information into the public record, 79 to which government agents have access (as members of the public), they have the opportunity to enter the public record and access the files therein. The question now becomes whether this generalized access is the type of access contemplated by the RFPA. When a statute is ambiguous, the interpreter is not restricted to the plain language of the text and may look beyond the language into that statute's legislative history to search for legislative intent. 80 To uncover the phrase's intended meaning, it is helpful to analyze the context within which the RFPA was enacted. The Supreme Court's decision in Miller, which prompted lawmakers to pass the RFPA, resulted in giving law enforcement agencies unfettered access to financial records as long as they obtained the records from the bank and not the customer herself.
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Because Congress passed the RFPA as remedial legislation (i.e., a statute designed to provide a remedy "for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries") 82 Court's insight that "the meaning of the statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, … the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.").
79. That is to say, the customer's information was put into the public record without perfecting any legitimate interest in the property (which is a listed exclusion to RFPA violations [VOL. 94:1057 enactment states its purpose as "strik[ing] a balance between customers' right of privacy and the need of law enforcement agencies to obtain financial records pursuant to legitimate investigations."
84 It follows that the RFPA's purpose was to give customers a legitimate expectation of privacy that the Miller Court found they do not constitutionally have. A broadly construed interpretation of the RFPA would err toward protecting a customer's privacy when ambiguities between the rights of the banks and the rights of its customers arise, as seen in Brackfield.
Another canon that serves to clarify the phrase "access to" is "the elementary principle that requires an interpreter 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.'" 85 Through this lens, instead of reading § 3403(a) as prohibiting financial institutions from providing "any Government authority access to or copies of, or the information contained in, the financial records of any customer [,] " 86 it would be read to prohibit the bank from performing three discrete kinds of acts: providing access to the records, providing copies of the records, or providing the information contained within the records. 87 The latter reading logically follows from the principle of interpretation that "[d]ifferent words used in the same . . . statute are assigned different meanings whenever possible."
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The statute's use of the disjunctive term "or" further supports the interpretation that "access to" has an independent meaning and is not simply a repetitive reinforcement of "copies of." In referring to the word "or," the Supreme Court explained that the term's "ordinary use is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to 'be given separate meanings. '" 89 By this understanding, any one of the three actions (providing access to, copies of, or information contained in the customer's records) is sufficient by itself to trigger a violation of the RFPA. This expansiveness shows Congress' attempt to broadly protect customer information from unwarranted government intrusion. 90 Finally, even if one is not inclined to interpret the phrase "access to" as a distinct and separate violation, the expressio unius maxim, which is the understanding that the inclusion of some things implies the exclusion of others, would render BB&T's actions in Brackfield an RFPA violation.
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The RFPA lists exceptions to liability when, among other things, there is a possible threat to national security, the bank has a good faith belief that a customer is engaging in illegal activity, or the bank is pursuing a legitimate lien or other claim on the customer's property. 92 Since there are exceptions specifically promulgated by the RFPA, a logical assumption is that if the bank's action is not on that list, then its actions are punishable under the RFPA. 91. This interpretive tool is listed last intentionally because it does not enjoy the same legal footing as the previously listed canons. "The expressio unius maxim receives wide legal application, yet there is nothing peculiarly legal about it. Instead, the maxim is a product of 'logic and common sense,' and derives from the general understanding and experience that when people say one thing they do not mean something else. It is also worth noting that the exceptions to liability listed in the RFPA are relatively broad. For a list of specific exceptions, see supra note 35 and accompanying text. In addition to these specific exemptions, the RFPA also provides an exemption for liability when a financial institution discloses any financial records that are not identified or identifiable as being derived from the financial records of a particular customer. See 12 U.S.C. § 3413(a) (2012). Section 3417, which lists the circumstances under which a customer may sue for disclosure, further shields financial institutions by allowing a good-faith defense that states financial institutions cannot be held liable when they rely on faulty government certificates in good faith. See id. § 3417(c). The fact that there are so many exceptions to holding a bank liable suggests that Congress intended that similar behaviors not listed in an exception should be dealt with harshly. Thus, as a matter of policy, the lax standard of liability the RFPA places on banks should be balanced with a broader reading of "access" in order to be able to truly "strike a balance between customers' right of privacy" and the needs of law enforcement to investigate criminal behavior. 93. However, this canon is only used when the intent of the statute is not apparent on its face. United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 519 (1912) ("The maxim invoked expresses a rule of construction, not of substantive law, and serves only as an aid in discovering the legislative intent when that is not otherwise manifest."). The argument presented in this Note is that the RFPA's intent is clear on its face. However, to the extent that it is not clear (as evidenced by the dismissal by the Brackfield court), this canon shows that in resolving a perceived ambiguity, the result should be the same: publishing a customer's record is not allowed by the statute.
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Requiring Government Obtainment
Under the presumption that the government has access to a customer's published financial information because the public record is indiscriminate in who can access it, the remaining question is whether the RFPA anticipated such access, and thus whether a customer can pursue statutory damages under the RFPA. 94 As mentioned earlier, there are few cases interpreting the exact meaning of what aggrieved customers must show to establish standing to sue for an alleged RFPA violation. 95 The protection of a customer's information is twofold: the RFPA prevents the bank from releasing that information and it prevents the government from obtaining the information. 96 So, it follows that to sue under each of the sections, the court would require a different showing of proof: that either the bank released the information or the government obtained it. 97 According to Brackfield, however, for an individual to establish standing for an RFPA claim against a bank (via § 3403) for putting the individual's information in the public record, "[p]laintiffs need only establish that their information was obtained by the Government." 98 This sentence was central to the court's decision to dismiss Brackfield. 99 The court's assertion, however, misapplies the RFPA.
Amidax: A Case Involving Government Obtainment
To understand why this sentence is misguided in the context of the Brackfield case, it is helpful to consider a case in which it is aptly used. A nearly identical statement to the one in Brackfield appears in a 2009 decision by the Southern District of New York when it was faced with deciding what a customer must prove to sue for an RFPA violation in a slightly different context. 100 There, the court stated that to establish standing, a "plaintiff need only establish that its information was obtained by the government." 101 In that case, Amidax Trading Group (Amidax) sued SWIFT, their financial institution, and the government, for (among other things) violating the RFPA by unlawfully providing the U.S. Treasury Department with Amidax's financial information. 102 The Treasury Department "issued a 'narrowly targeted subpoena' to SWIFT, seeking only records of individuals 'tied to terrorism.'" 103 Amidax alleged that SWIFT did not comply with the constraints of the subpoena, and instead handed over their entire database of customer information. 104 Amidax's only proof of this claim, however, was one anonymous source from a New York Times article, which stated that the entire database had been handed over, and a statement by the Treasury Secretary that stated that SWIFT had offered "to give them all the data."
105 Contradictory evidence presented (including facts from the same New York Times article from which the quote was pulled) showed that "SWIFT made clear that it could provide data only in response to a valid subpoena and insisted that the data be used only for terrorism investigations."
106 Thus, Amidax's RFPA claim was dismissed for lack of standing when Amidax was unable to show that their specific information was among the records handed over to the government. 107 In this case, the financial institution provided both access to and provision of some customer information to the government. The customers, therefore, could have established standing only by showing that their information was among the records obtained by the government. 108 In other words, the government's obtainment of the customer information implies that it had access, for it could not have obtained the information without first having access to it. Thus, the requirement that the customer "need only 2009 106. Amidax II, 671 F.3d at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted). Amidax proffered that SWIFT had given its entire database of customer information to the government but offered only a quote from an anonymous source published by the New York Times as evidence of its claim. Id. at 146. Because only one anonymous source of the nearly twenty sources interviewed stated that SWIFT had handed over the entire database, the court concluded that "Amidax's allegation that SWIFT's entire database was handed over to the government [was] speculative and conjectural and thus insufficient to establish a basis for Amidax's standing to sue." Id.
107. Id. at 147-48. 108. Amidax I, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (stating that the injury-in-fact test "requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured") (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972)).
[VOL. 94:1057 establish that their information was obtained by the Government" 109 to establish standing should only apply in this context, i.e., when obtainment is at issue.
Unlike the situation in Amidax, the customer in Brackfield was not suing under a claim of relief stemming from the government unlawfully obtaining their financial information. Instead, the customer claimed that the bank unlawfully provided the government with access to that information. 110 In Amidax, access to the information was immaterial because access to and obtainment of the information happened simultaneously. Thus, it was logically sound for the court to require the plaintiff to show that the government had obtained their information. However, in Brackfield, access was not immaterial to resolving the controversy-it was the central issue.
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The government, as a member of the entire world that has free and open access to the information in public records, currently has access to the Brackfield customer's information. It has not, however, necessarily obtained that information. Thus, in stating that the customer needs to show that their information was obtained by the government in order to sue, the Brackfield court incorrectly conflated two distinct RFPA violations: (1) a financial institution granting access to that information, 112 and (2) the government obtaining the information. 113 The court should have addressed the plaintiff's standing in the context of the financial institution improperly providing the government with access, instead of addressing the collateral issue of whether the government had obtained such information.
Finally, it is worth noting that the reason the Amidax court dismissed the case was not because the government never reviewed the customer's files, 114 but only because Amidax "failed to affirmatively aver that there was an actual provision of access to, copies of, or information contained in financial records to a Government authority." 115 The same court that decided Amidax confirmed this interpretation of the decision after the of the data in question, if it had in fact occurred, as an injury sufficient to confer standing, without considering whether such data were likely to be reviewed." 116 Thus, even the case that the bank relied on as persuasive authority in the Brackfield controversy recognized that actual review of the information is less important to the inquiry into an RFPA violation than obtainment.
The Structure of The Right to Financial Privacy Act: Protection from Disclosure and Obtainment
The RFPA's statutory scheme lends credence to the interpretation that, by granting a government authority access to a customer's financial information (be it the primary intent or an unanticipated consequence), a bank violates the RFPA. The RFPA grants customers a cause of action against either, or both, of two entities that violate the statute: a financial institution and a government authority. 117 This separation of entities against which claims can be brought protects customer information in two ways: allowing aggrieved customers whose financial information has been improperly disclosed a right of action against (1) the governmental authority that obtained the records, and (2) the financial institution that disclosed them. 118 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out the different functions of these sections and concluded that, when it enacted the RFPA, "Congress limited both the disclosure of customer records by financial institutions and the acquisition of such information by governmental entities. It did so by enacting two 'companion' sections, one directed at the actions of governmental entities, and the other directed at the actions of financial institutions."
119 If, as the Brackfield court held, the RFPA only contemplated situations in which a financial institution directly and intentionally provides access to a government authority, 120 there would never be an instance in which an aggrieved customer would sue one entity and not the other, rendering the separation of the two actions inconsequential. In light of the statute's stated goal of providing customers [VOL. 94:1057 a right to privacy of their financial information, except when obtained pursuant to "legitimate investigations" by law enforcement, 121 perhaps a more reasonable interpretation would be to read the statute as keeping financial information from being both disclosed and obtained. 122 The separation of each entity's obligations under the statute supports the interpretation that financial institutions have duties to their customers that are broader than the duty not to directly hand over customer information to government authorities. 123 Additionally, § 3403, titled "Confidentiality of financial records," states that "[a] financial institution shall not release the financial records of a customer until the Government authority seeking such records certifies in writing to the financial institution that it has complied with the applicable provisions of this chapter."
124 Of two possible interpretations, one is eventually contradicted in the RFPA, and should not be considered valid.
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A more natural interpretation suggests that the bank has an independent duty to safeguard customer financial information until supplied with written notification of RFPA compliance. The Tenth Circuit interpreted the RFPA in the same manner, stating: "The RFPA prohibits the release of 'financial records' unless set procedures are followed." 122. See Tucker, 83 F.3d at 692. This court used the existence of the RFPA's companion sections (liability of both the government and the financial institution) to show that, in the context of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, a statute modeled after the RFPA, the absence of one of the "companion" sections (specifically, a § 3402 analog) "indicates that Congress did not intend to authorize civil suits against governmental entities for improperly obtaining customer records." Id.
123. Before the Brackfield decision, the Sixth Circuit framed the RFPA as "impos[ing] an affirmative duty on the government and banking officials to safeguard the financial records of individuals utilizing the services of banks." In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983). This duty is violated in two instances: disclosure and obtainment of customer information (outside the confines of legal process). Id.
124. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 125. One could interpret the phrase "until the Government authority seeking such records" as implying that this section only applies when a government authority has already begun actively seeking a customer's records. However, the RFPA goes on to state:
Nothing in this chapter shall preclude a financial institution, as an incident to perfecting a security interest . . . , from providing copies of any financial record to any court or Government authority. Id. § 3403(d)(1). In the situation this exception describes, bank-to-government communication is not required and, even when such intervention is necessary (i.e., when the government guarantees part of the loan), it is listed as a separate exception. See id. § 3403(d)(2).
Thus, as discussed in Part III-B, the canon expressio unius would render the Brackfield scenario of a bank releasing a customer's information not in pursuance of "perfecting a security interest" as intentionally omitted and thus, prohibited from being released.
126. Anderson v. La Junta State Bank, 115 F.3d 756, 759 (10th Cir. 1997).
Finally, the RFPA's § 3412 provision regarding interagency transfers within the government sheds some light on the scope of privacy its writers had in mind.
127 "This section provides that information obtained under the title may not be used or retained for any purpose other than the specific statutory purpose for which the information was originally obtained, and that the information may not be transferred to another government agency without specific statutory authorization."
128 Thus, once the government does obtain the information, it is prohibited not only from sharing such information among other branches, but the information's use is limited even within the original agency. The customer protection provided by this provision shows the wide scope of protection that Congress intended to confer to customers of financial institutions. This protective measure would be entirely thwarted if the information were made public, granting any person or agency of the government access, without the need to abide by any legal process.
D. Policy Considerations in Reading The Right to Financial Privacy Act
The text of the RFPA, read plainly or through the use of canons; the judicial interpretation of similar statutes; and the general acceptance of statutory injuries as sufficient for standing, work together to support a finding that public disclosure of a customer's information is a violation of the RFPA. The intent of the representatives behind the act, as is visible in the RFPA's structure and its legislative history, further supports this notion. Finally, public policy considerations reinforce the idea that a bank should not be able to bypass the customer protections put in place by the RFPA simply by publishing the information at large.
Interpreting the RFPA as allowing a financial institution to publish customer information, so long as there is no direct contact between a bank and the government, would undermine the RFPA's purpose of providing individuals with privacy in their financial records. 129 The Eleventh Circuit case Lopez v. First Union Nat'l Bank considered whether a financial institution could disclose customer information to law enforcement officers if they suspected "any possible violation of the law," pursuant to the "safe harbor provisions" of the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act. [VOL. 94:1057
The court decided that for the provision to apply, there must be a good-faith basis for the connection between suspected illegal activity and the accounts from which information is disclosed:
If it were otherwise, a bank would have free license to disclose information from any and every account in the entire bank once it suspected illegal activity in any account at the bank. We do not think Congress intended such a drastic result which would needlessly strip away any right or expectation of privacy in financial records and effectively undo virtually all of what Congress did when it enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act . . . .
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The court's concern that, by the defendant's proposed reading of the statute, a financial institution could disclose the financial information of customers who were not suspected of illegal activities mirrors the concerns arising from Brackfield. If a financial institution's disclosure of customer information to the public as a whole is outside the protection of the RFPA, so long as there was no direct communication with a government authority, then it would allow financial institutions to publicize every customer's information-in effect allowing every government authority unbridled access to every customer's information. This result would certainly "needlessly strip away any right or expectation of privacy," 132 and undermine the RFPA's purpose entirely.
Another court explained, "[t]he basic thrust of the [RFPA] is that customers of financial institutions are entitled to notice of any government request for their financial records and an opportunity to challenge the request."
133 By this understanding, the statute would have no purpose in cases where the bank's actions were not deemed an RFPA violation. Once the information is released into the public record, financial institutions would not receive requests for the information by the government and would be thereby unable to provide its customers with notice. In the end, this result would undercut the purpose of the RFPA by stripping away the customer's ability to challenge the request before the government has obtained the information.
Had the bank in Brackfield been securing a legitimate interest in the customer's property, their actions would be protected by the RFPA. 134 In reality, the bank provided the government access to customer financial information without the protections of the above exception, nor any other exception (such as assisting in a legitimate investigation). Acceptance of the Brackfield decision would render the RFPA toothless and stunt its ability to accomplish its stated goal of balancing customer privacy with allowing legitimate government investigations into customers' records. 135 
IV. STATUTORY VIOLATIONS AS INJURIES-IN-FACT
Even if a court is persuaded by the proposal that a bank violates the RFPA by granting the government access to a customer's information, the customer faces another hurdle in protecting his financial privacy: the issue of standing. The answer to whether a customer can sue his bank for an RFPA violation after it publishes his information depends on whether the statutory damages are recognized as sufficient for Article III standing. 136 For a plaintiff to have standing, he must prove that he has suffered a concrete and particularized "injury in fact," which is actual or imminent (as opposed to conjectural or hypothetical); that his injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's actions; and, finally, that it is likely that a favorable decision by the court will redress his injury. 137 In addition to these requirements, "there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of."
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A. The Right to Financial Privacy Act's Statutory Damages Provision
In Brackfield, the conduct "complained of" is that the bank violated the RFPA by improperly providing government authorities with access to the customer's financial information. 139 However, the injuries alleged (e.g., tarnished credit score and lost value to their property) flow from private parties having access to the customer's information, not from the 135. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 136. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting the power of the courts to deciding cases or controversies). This limitation has been interpreted as requiring that "the plaintiff himself has suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action" before the case can properly come before a federal court. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) [VOL. 94:1057 government having access to it. 140 Thus, the very basis of the RFPA claim did not result in these injuries, and the customer did not even allege that they did. 141 The Brackfield court agreed with the bank in concluding that the customer cannot claim an actual injury from the publication of his information, and dismissed the case with prejudice. 142 The court, however, failed to address that actual damages are but one of the four types of recovery available for an RFPA violation.
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The RFPA provides:
[A]ny…financial institution obtaining or disclosing financial records . . . in violation of this chapter is liable to the customer . . . in an amount equal to the sum of-(1) $100 without regard to the volume of records involved; (2) any actual damages sustained by the customer as a result of the disclosure; (3) such punitive damages as the court may allow, where the violation is found to have been willful or intentional; and (4) in the case of any successful action to enforce liability under this section, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the court. 144 Thus, a customer lacking actual damages from the disclosure does not end the inquiry of whether he has standing, as § 3417(a)(1) awards damages for a statutory injury as well.
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There has been recent disagreement about whether a statutory injury, occurring when a person's statutory rights have been violated, will suffice as an injury-in-fact necessary for standing in order to sue for the corresponding statutory damages. 146 There are several federal statutes 144. 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a) (2012). 145. Although the $100 award may appear to be de minimus, this Note assumes such concerns are secondary in the effort to explore the actual rights, duties, and obligations of the parties to the litigation without giving the issues short shrift. Additionally, if BB&T has a habit of publishing customer information in this way, a successful class action suit (and the corresponding legal fees) could raise the damages to an amount much greater than the seemingly de minimus $100 sought here. granting plaintiffs damages in an amount, range, or floor set by the statute itself.
147 However, courts have disagreed on whether a statutory damages provision means that mere violation of the statute is sufficient to confer Article III standing, 148 or whether it is simply a tool for encouraging lawsuits in cases where the actual damages would otherwise be too small to justify a suit or require quantifying damages that are difficult to compute.
149 Some of this confusion comes from the apparent contradiction between circuits allowing claims for statutory injuries and the Article III requirement that plaintiffs have an actual injury. 150 For the Brackfield court, the issue of whether a plaintiff claiming a statutory damage award for an RFPA violation, without proving actual damages flowing from the violation, was one of first impression. 151 Ultimately, the court decided that since the customers could not claim an actual injury under the RFPA, their RFPA claim must be dismissed. 152 The two circuits that addressed the issue headon, however, decided that the $100 statutory fine applies regardless of whether the customer incurred actual damages. 153 Although the Brackfield 156 This power is limited by two characteristics plaintiffs are required to have in order to sue. First, the plaintiff must be "among the injured" in that his statutory rights were violated. 157 Second, a violation of a right created by Congress "must cause individual, rather than collective, harm." 158 The first requirement is met in Brackfield because the government was given access to the records of the plaintiffs, which places them sufficiently "among the injured." And because the statute in question does not "'authorize suits by members of the public at large, '" 159 the second requirement is met, as in Beaudry. The statute instead authorizes only suits by "the customer to whom such records relate."
160 Thus, by the standard set forth in Beaudry, the customer in Brackfield meets the requirements for standing to sue by showing injury-in-fact through applicability of the statutory damages provision.
However, an important distinction between the FCRA, discussed in Beaudry, and the RFPA, at issue in Brackfield, is the wording of the statutes' provisions for statutory damages. Central to the court's reasoning in Beaudry was the difference in damages available for willful violations (actual, punitive, and statutory) as compared to negligent violations (actual only). 161 The Sixth Circuit used the differing treatment to quell fears of creating a "strict-liability regime" by reading the law to allow statutory damages without injury. 162 Unlike the FRCA, the RFPA does not prescribe statutory damages based on culpability; only punitive damages depend on the intent of the violator. 163 Because of this conflation of negligence and intentional violations, the court may have been wary of creating the "strictliability regime" that the Sixth Circuit was careful to avoid in Beaudry. However, the two Circuits admitting the RFPA's statutory damages regardless of actual damages did not express concern about creating such a regime. 164 In any case, these concerns should be greatly diminished by the RFPA's "good-faith defense" provision, which states that any financial institution making disclosures in good-faith reliance on government certificates shall not be held liable. 165 Thus, liability under the RFPA is limited to only those financial institutions that voluntarily provide the government with access to customer information, as seen in Brackfield.
Given the RFPA's text, statutory scheme, treatment by other courts and policy goals, the Brackfield customer's suit should not have been dismissed for lack of standing. An unpublished opinion from the Northern District of Illinois analyzed an RFPA standing challenge this way: "It is well settled [VOL. 94:1057 that a statute itself may create a legal right, the invasion of which causes an injury sufficient to create standing." 166 Specifically, the court reasoned that "[t]he RFPA creates for private citizens a right to sue and recover actual or statutory damages for violations; the statute thus by its own terms creates a legally-protected interest." 167 Had the Brackfield court followed a similar line of reasoning, the case would not have been dismissed for lack of standing. Given the precedential weight of Beaudry and the clarity with which it sets out a method to address the viability of statutory damages as injuries-in-fact, denying the dismissal would have been a legally sound result.
B. Spokeo: Complicating the Inquiry of Statutory Injuries
Despite the common-sense interpretation of the RFPA set forth up to this point, the privacy protections provided by the RFPA are under siege from another angle which threatens to render the RFPA (and other statutes aimed to protect against the third-party-doctrine-shaped hole created by Miller) all but useless. In May 2016, the Supreme Court decided Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. 168 Although the decision was about the alleged violation of an FCRA provision, it provides guidance in cases such as Brackfield in which a different statute is used but the harm is of a general nature, such as the dissemination of information.
The plaintiff in the underlying case was a man claiming that the website Spokeo.com published inaccurate information about him online. 169 Publishing false information about a person can be a violation of the FRCA requirement that companies "follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom [it] relates." 170 Strangely, in this instance, the inaccuracies manifested in Spokeo listed him as more wealthy and educated than he actually was. 171 Robins claimed that the actual injuries resulting from the misinformation included harm to his employment prospects, prolonged unemployment, and anxiety about his diminished employment prospects.
172
The Ninth Circuit noted that his allegations of injury were sparse, 173 but after employing the Beaudry factors, ultimately decided that the violation of Robins's statutory rights was sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing. 174 On April 27, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the issue of " [w] hether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm . . . by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute." 175 Commentator Amy Howe listed three possible outcomes: 176 First, and most unlikely, the Court could have found that a plaintiff need only allege a statutory violation, without pointing to a concrete harm. 177 Second, the Court could have decided that there can only be standing when a plaintiff shows a violation of the statute and "real world" harm arising from that violation. 178 Third, the Court could have found that Spokeo's publication of incorrect information about Robins actually was an injury-in-fact. 179 The third outcome would have allowed the Court to update the law by recognizing a new type of injury. In a critique of the legacy of Prosser's influential article on privacy law, 180 Professors Neil Richards and Daniel Solove have urged lawmakers to adapt the law to modern times by coming to a more sophisticated conception of harm-one that recognizes "harms of a more intangible nature," such as "harms to one's psyche and emotions." 181 Unfortunately, the eight-member Court rebuffed the opportunity to definitively decide the issue. The majority instead simply remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for a more complete analysis of the injuryexpressly declining to take a position on whether the Ninth Circuit's [VOL. 94:1057 ultimate conclusion, that Robins was injured by the FCRA violation, was correct. 182 The decision did little work on clearing up the area of the law on whether a "real world" injury is required to bring an action based on a statutory violation and the case could wind up back in front of the Justices if they do not approve of the Ninth Circuit's position on remand.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDED INTERPRETATION
Although it would be a step in the right direction, even the most favorable outcome for Robins in the Spokeo case would not fully address the RFPA loophole allowed in Brackfield. As discussed in Part III-C, the court interpreted the statute to require a showing of government obtainment before a plaintiff can sue. Thus, in light of the RFPA's organizational framework, legislative history, its interpretation by other district and circuit courts, and policy considerations in carrying out its intended purpose, illegitimately publishing a customer's financial information in the public record should be interpreted as providing government authorities access to that information in violation of the RFPA. Perhaps much of this discussion seems painstakingly nitpicky to the point of being overly critical of the court's decision in Brackfield. After all, BB&T's publication of the customer's information was most likely a clerical oversight, as opposed to an attempt to sneak past the RFPA's protections by taking advantage of its slippery wording. As the saying goes, "never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity."
183 So, examining the minutiae of the RFPA may seem like an exercise in futility since the situation of a bank publishing a customer's information is such a rare occurrence. But that is precisely why it is important for the court to rule in favor of the customer under these facts. This result would be of little impact to banks and financial institutions because the act of publishing a customer's information is likely not a regularly conducted business activity, as it serves no purpose to the bank. 184 However, the urged result would have a meaningful impact for bank customers because they could rest assured that any sensitive 182. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (finding the Ninth Circuit's standing analysis incomplete because, although it analyzed Robins's injury for its particularity to him, it failed to address whether the alleged FCRA violation "entail[ed] a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement"). y on you. Have another lawyer: w United States Court ofvernment involvementPAank'en informatino y on you. Have another lawyer: w183.
This aphorism is often called "Hanlon's razor." OXFORD TREASURY OF SAYINGS AND QUOTATIONS 294 (Susan Ratcliffe ed., 2011).
184. Publishing information in pursuit of a lien or other property interest is explicitly permissible under the RFPA. 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2012). information they give their bank would remain confidential unless it was being sought by the government via legal measures-they would even be able to contest the government access to their files before it was given. 185 Such a result would be more in line with the intent and purpose of the statute and is a more suitable interpretation of the RFPA. 186 Aside from achieving a legally sound result, upholding the customers' challenge in Brackfield would have been a judicially expedient move. Privacy concerns today mirror the concerns in the 1970s 187 that spurred lawmakers to pass privacy protections like the RFPA in the first place. Today, however, technology plays an even bigger role than was imaginable at the time of the RFPA's passage. According to a report by the U.S. Census Bureau, as of 2013, 83.8% of U.S. households owned a computer and 74.4% of U.S. households had Internet access. 188 Ideally, legislators would adapt older laws to better serve their purpose as technology advances. Unfortunately, however, lawmakers have been playing catch-up in regulating how individuals, corporations, and the government can use emerging technologies as a way to collect and store personal data. 189 Because of this disparity, rapidly changing technology, and slowly adapting laws, courts should err on the side of protecting individuals when faced with interpreting older laws in a new way. This is especially true for the Brackfield case where the law can be read to protect the individual's information by a plain reading of the statute. 190 Even if the Sixth Circuit agrees with the interpretation that the RFPA prohibits banks from publishing customer information in the public record, and even if the Spokeo decision comes down in favor of the plaintiff, the protection of financial privacy remains insubstantial. The RFPA, though a [VOL. 94:1057 valiant attempt to patch the hole in Fourth Amendment protection left by Miller, is limited to protecting individuals or small partnerships from financial institutions and the federal government. 191 The RFPA by no means represents the pinnacle of privacy laws; it does not protect the release of financial information from other entities or access to it from state government agents. The Supreme Court created the third-party doctrine in 1967, and in order to comprehensively protect financial information in the hands of trusted third parties, the Court must reverse it. 
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